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Reference for Prosecution in
Juvenile Court Proceedings
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act includes cases involving
children who have allegedly violated the law within the juvenile
court's delinquency jurisdiction.' Under certain circumstances,
however, the juvenile court may waive such jurisdiction and refer
a case for prosecution in a court of criminal jurisdiction as though
the child were an adult.2 Although whether to refer a juvenile
for prosecution as an adult offender is among the most serious
decisions a juvenile court must make, the Minnesota statute
lacks adequate procedural and substantive standards to guide
the court and other participants in this decision-making process.
Article 8 of the recently adopted Minnesota Juvenile Court
Rules was designed to establish both procedural and substantive
criteria applicable to the juvenile court's decision to refer for
prosecution. The Article is an attempt to cure the defects in the
statute, to establish uniform procedure in Minnesota, and to
assure that recent Supreme Court requirements are met.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze Article 8 as a response
to the problems inherent in the reference process. In addition,
the Note will compare the Minnesota approach with rule and
statutory approaches in other jurisdictions and suggest possible
improvements in the Article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL
Central to all juvenile court acts is the policy determination
that young persons who violate the law are not to be treated as
1. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends also to acts
not in violation of the criminal law. See Mnmn. STAT. § 260.111 (1967),
conferring jurisdiction on the juvenile court in proceedings concerning any person under 18 alleged to be delinquent, a juvenile traffic offender, neglected or dependent, and in proceedings concerning
any minor alleged to have been delinquent or a juvenile traffic offender
prior to becoming 18. The definition of "delinquent child" includes not
only law violators but also, for example, persons who "habitually deport" themselves in a manner that is "injurious or dangerous" to
themselves or others. Id. § 260.015(5) (e). The issues considered in
this Note, however, arise only where a violation of law is alleged.
2. Many statutes refer to the process as "waiver of jurisdiction."
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1966). In Minnesota, it is termed
"reference for prosecution." M=. STAT. § 260.125 (1967). While the
processes are not identical, see note 21 infra, the Minnesota terminology, "reference for prosecution" will be used in this Note.
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adult offenders. Nonetheless, statutes in nearly all jurisdictions
provide a method whereby juveniles may be tried in the criminal
court.3 While the statutory schemes vary considerably, 4 the majority of states provide the juvenile court with original and exclusive jurisdiction for all juveniles, with discretionary power to
waive its jurisdiction and refer the case for prosecution in all or
certain specified cases. 5

The issue of reference for prosecution generally arises where
the alleged offense is particularly serious, or where the youth
has committed a number of offenses. 6

Reference for prosecution

deprives the child of all the benefits conferred by the juvenile
court act upon juveniles as a group.

In

addition to the risk of

3. Some jurisdictions have not adopted this approach, however.
New York juvenile courts have "exclusive original jurisdiction" over
delinquency cases, without provision for transfer to criminal court.
Thus, children under 16 (the jurisdictional age) cannot be tried in
criminal court under any circumstances. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 713
(McKinney 1963).
4. Some jurisdictions grant the criminal court jurisdiction concurrent with the juvenile court, allowing the criminal court to assert
or waive its jurisdiction. See, e.g., CAL. WEI-.
& INsTN's CODE §§ 600,
604 (West 1966) where the juvenile court's jurisdiction is exclusive to
age 18, and is concurrent with the criminal court from age 18 to 21.
California also permits waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court of a
minor 16 or over. Id. § 707 (Supp. 1968). Others lodge discretion with
the State's Attorney to determine in which court the action is to be
brought. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 37, § 702-07 (Supp. 1969). This practice is now of doubtful validity under the ruling in Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See text accompanying notes 10-14 infra.
A small number of jurisdictions grant the criminal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over particular offenses, usually those of a serious nature.
E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3204 (Supp. 1968).
This scheme has been
criticized as incompatible with the avowed rehabilitative purpose of
the juvenile court system. See, e.g., U.S. CHILDREN's BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEW, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 34 (1966).
5. E.g., MNN. STAT. § 260.125 (1967).
This method is favored
by the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957);
PRESIDENT'S COMvf'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD. or JUsTIcE, TASK
FORCE REPORT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIn
25 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE]. Most statutes of this type place the
discretionary authority solely in the juvenile court. Once jurisdiction is
waived, the prosecutor has no authority to refuse to accept reference.
See, e.g., TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(6) (j) (Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1553 (1966).
The Minnesota statate is to the contrary, placing
further discretion in the prosecutor. See note 21 inIra.
6. See, e.g., State ex rel. Craig v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 158, 116
N.W.2d 657 (1962) (first degree robbery); State v. Dehler, 257 Minn.
549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960) (first degree murder); State ex rel. Pett
v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 90 N.W.2d 219 (1958) (first degree murder); State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234
(1957) (second degree murder).
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receiving the maximum punishment which the criminal law allows-including incarceration long past age 21-the confidential
nature of the juvenile court is replaced by the publicity associated with the criminal courts. If found guilty, the juvenile
acquires a criminal record, resulting in the loss of certain civil
rights including eligibility for particular types of public employment.7 While reference is not a frequent occurrence in the juvenile court in terms of total dispositions s it may indeed be the
most severe sanction which the juvenile court can impose. It is
the instrument by which the juvenile court may choose to subject
a youth to the severe consequences of the criminal law, and is in
effect the first stage in a criminal prosecution.9
The statutes generally do not establish procedural requirements governing the reference process. The Supreme Court considered the lack of such requirements in its first juvenile court
7. See generally Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968); Comment, Representing
the Juvenile in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 424 (1968); Comment, Separating the Criminal From the Delinquent: Due Process in
CertificationProcedure,40 So. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1967).
8. See Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal
Courts, 8 CRiImq & DELINQ. 3, 10 (1962); Ketcham, Statistical Comparison of Children's Courts Serving the Nation's Twelve Largest
Cities, 13 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 14 (1962); Schornhorst, supra note 7, at 589
n.45; Young, Significant Recent Cases, 17 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 97 (1966).
Figures contained in Minnesota Department of Corrections reports
indicate that in fiscal year 1966-67, the 84 probate-juvenile courts in
Minnesota disposed of 7317 petitions, 350 of which were referred for

prosecution. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, COUNTY JUVENMIE COURT
AND PROBATION OFFICE REPORT (1966-67).

9. Many supporters of the juvenile court have criticized the process of reference for prosecution as a facade for society's insistence on
punishment in particular cases and as inconsistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court. See, e.g., Sargent & Gordon,
Waiver of Jurisdiction: An Evaluation of the Process in the Juvenile
Court, 9 CRIME & DELiNQ. 121 (1963). Others have argued that this
view stems from a failure to recognize that the juvenile court is a
complex legal institution which embraces a wide range of values.
These writers have insisted that the view of the juvenile court as a
wholly rehabilitative institution is inadequate because it fails to explain the activity of the court in cases where it is incapable of achieving its rehabilitative objectives. Thus, it is argued, in many cases the
juvenile court performs functions essentially similar to those exercised
by any court adjudicating cases of persons charged with dangerous
behavior-reasserting community norms, protecting community security and deterrence-by such measures as it has at its disposal, as
unsatisfactory as those measures may be in a particular case. See,
e.g., Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice,
11 WAYNE L. REv. 676 (1965).
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decision, Kent v. United States.0 In Kent, the juvenile court had
referred the case for prosecution and, in the district court, the
juvenile was found guilty of housebreaking and robbery. The
Court considered only the issue of the procedural adequacy of
the juvenile court's reference for prosecution" under the District
of Columbia statute, which required a "full investigation" prior
to reference.12 The Court held that the statute, "read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the
assistance of counsel," required as a condition of a valid referral
order: (1) a hearing on the issue, (2) access by counsel to social
reports considered by the court and (3) a statement of the reasons for the juvenile court's decision.' 3 Because of the Court's
emphasis upon the "constitutional principles" involved, it seems
clear that the holding has implications beyond the District of
Columbia statute.' 4
Corresponding to the omission of procedural requirements,
the various reference for prosecution statutes also lack substantive standards to govern the reference decision. Although
the statutes usually establish minimum ages at which reference
can be considered, some do not limit the nature of the acts for
10. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

This decision prompted re-evaluation of

reference statutes in many jurisdictions, and has led to statutory revisions in some states, and to the adoption of rules of procedure governing
reference in others. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. STAT., art. 2338-1 (Supp. 1968);
DISTRICT OF COLUMIBIA, JUVENILE COURT RULES (1966); MIcHIGA
JUVENILE COURT RIULES (1969); RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1969),
as
amended, (Supp. Sept. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MJCR].
11. Both the district court's verdict and the juvenile court's decision to refer were challenged on various procedural grounds.
12. The District of Columbia statute is representative of those statutes which establish neither procedural nor substantive criteria:
When a child 16 years of age or over is charged with an offense
which if committed by a person 18 years of age or over is a
felony, or when a child under 18 years of age is charged with
an offense which if committed by a person 18 years of age or
over is punishable by death or life imprisonment, a judge may,
after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order the child
held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which
would have jurisdiction of the offense if committed by a person
18 years of age or over ....
D.C. CODE ANN.§ 11-1553 (1966).
13. 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
14. Kent has been followed by Paquette v. Langlois, 101 R.I. 1,
219 A.2d 569 (1966); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739
(1966); In re Dillenberg v.Maxwell, 70 Wash. 331, 413 P.2d 940 (1966).

The New Mexico Court has interpreted Kent restrictively, State v.
Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 428 P.2d 658

(1967).

See generally Paulsen,

Kent v. United States: The ConstitutionalContext of Juvenile Cases, 1966
Sup. CT. REV. 167.
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which reference is possible.' 5 A few statutes provide some cri-

teria for consideration 16 but most provide for reference on
grounds solely within the discretion of the juvenile court.17
Thus, most juvenile courts have been left with the responsibility
for fashioning their own criteria for reference.
This lack of standards has handicapped the youth and his
counsel in arguing against reference. Further, the opportunity
for abuse of the court's discretion appears to have been substantial's since typically, the juvenile judge has not even been
required to state the reasons on which he bases his decision to
refer. As a result, appellate review of a reference decision has
been difficult to obtain,' 9 and the crucial decision on which the
distinction between crime and delinquency turns has been obscure and ill-defined.
B.

MNNEsoTA

The juvenile court in Minnesota has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over any person under 18 who is alleged to be delinquent and over any minor alleged to have been delinquent prior
to reaching the age of 18.20 However, the juvenile court has
authority to waive its jurisdiction and refer the case for prosecution in accordance with the requirements of the reference
statute. 21 The Minnesota Act-like all juvenile court acts-

further provides that a violation of state or local law by a youth
15. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1966), which establishes
age and offense limitations, with MAl=. STAT. § 260.125 (1967), which
provides no limitation on the offense. See notes 12 supra and 23 infra.
16. E.g., TEX. Civ. STAT., art. 2338-1(6) (h) (1)-(6) (Supp. 1968).
17.

E.g., D.C.

CODE

ANN. § 11-1553 (1966), quoted at note 12 supra.

18. See, e.g., United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545 (D.D.C.
1965), infra note 63.
19. See generally Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile
Court, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 313-14 (1967); Comment, Criminal Of-

fenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (1966).
20. MINN.STAT. § 260.111 (1967).
21. Alum. STAT. § 260.125 (1967). The

Minnesota reference statute differs from the waiver statutes of other jurisdictions in that the
case is referred to the prosecutor who determines whether or not to
prosecute.

If the prosecutor decides not to prosecute, the juvenile

court must proceed with the case. Compare the Minnesota juvenile traffic offender procedure wherein the juvenile court transfers the case
to the court of competent jurisdiction and the prosecutor has no authority to determine whether or not to prosecute. MliNw. STAT. § 260.193
(1967).
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under 18 is not designated a crime unless the case is referred to
22
an appropriate prosecuting authority.

The Minnesota reference statute allows the court to refer
any juvenile charged with a violation of law who is 14 years of
age or older.23 Unlike the statutes of many jurisdictions, the

Minnesota statute does provide certain basic procedural requirements to govern the process. It requires that the court, after
giving notice, hold a hearing on the issue of whether to refer the
case for prosecution. The statute,
however, is silent on the na24
ture of the hearing to be held.
22. MIvNN. STAT. § 260.215 (1967).
23. MnqN. STAT. § 260.125 (1967) provides:
Subdivision 1. When a child is alleged to have violated a state or
local law or ordinance after becoming 14 years of age the juvenile court may enter an order referring the alleged violation
to the appropriate prosecuting authority for action under laws
in force governing the commission of and punishment for violations of statutes or local laws or ordinances. The prosecuting
authority to whom such matter is referred shall within the time
specified in such order of reference, which time shall not exceed 90 days, file with the court making such order of reference notice of intent to prosecute or not to prosecute. If such
prosecuting authority files notice o:2 intent not to prosecute or
fails to act within the time specified, the court shall proceed as
if no order of reference had been made. If such prosecuting
authority files with the court notice of intent to prosecute the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court in the matter is terminated.
Subdivision 2. The juvenile court may order a reference only if
(a) A petition has been filed in accordance with the provisions of section 260.131
(b) Notice has been given in accordance with the provisions
of sections 260.135 and 260.141
(c) A hearing has been held in accordance with the provisions of section 260.155, and
(d) The court finds that the child is not suitable to treatment
or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of
laws relating to juvenile courts.
Subdivision 3. When the juvenile court enters an order referring
an alleged violation to a prosecuting authority, the prosecuting
authority shall proceed with the case as if the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court had never attached.
24. The statutory provisions were substantially revised in 1959.
The prior reference statute had established no standards but allowed
the court to refer any juvenile over 12 years solely in its discretion.
The act required, however, notice to the parents if their addresses were
known. In State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d
234 (1957), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the notice requirement of the statute was jurisdictional. Hence, the juvenile court's failure to notify the juvenile's mother of the reference hearing invalidated
the subsequent reference order. The juvenile thus could not be prosecuted in the criminal court prior to a valid reference proceeding in the
juvenile court.
The 1959 revision was apparently intended to stress the seriousness
of the reference proceeding. In addition to raising the minimum age
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The Minnesota statute conforms with two of the three procedural requirements of a valid reference order established by
Kent.25 The statute has long required a hearing and was
amended in 1967 to provide for access by counsel to social records. 28 However, it fails to comply with Kent by not requiring
a written statement of the court's reasons for its decision. 27
Substantively, before the court can order reference, it
must find that the child is "not suitable to treatment" or that the
"public safety is not served" under the provisions of the juvenile
court laws. 28 The statute, however, neither defines these conclusions nor indicates what factors are relevant to their determination. It seems likely that the criteria deemed relevant may
vary substantially between courts. Neither the Supreme Court
in Kent nor the Minnesota Supreme Court has ever considered
the issue of the propriety of substantive criteria for making the
reference decision.
III. ANALYSIS OF MINNESOTA JUVENILE COURT RULES,
ARTICLE 8: REFERENCE FOR PROSECUTION
Article 8 of the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules was promulgated to provide specific procedural and substantive standards governing the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction under
the reference for prosecution section of the Minnesota statute.
Generally, it provides how, when, and who may make the motion
for reference. It prescribes the content of the notice of the hearing on the issue. The Article incorporates by reference the
basic Article 2 rights of the juvenile at the hearing, for example,
the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. The Article
clarifies what evidence is admissible at the reference hearing.
Further, the Article indicates specific criteria deemed relevant
to the decision to refer the juvenile for prosecution as an adult.

A. TH CHILD'S REQUEST FOR REFERENCE FOR PROSECUTION
The Minnesota statute does not specify who may request
at which criminal prosecution is permitted from 12 to 14, it specified
the procedural requirements to entering a valid reference order in light
of Knutson. See generally Pirsig, Juvenile Delinquency and Crime:
Achievements of the 1959 Minnesota Legislature, 44 IVbm. L. REv. 363
(1960).

25. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
26. AMfmN. STAT. § 260.161(2) (1967).
27. See ibnw. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (1967), quoted at note 23
supra.
28.

Id.
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reference for prosecution. 29 However, the juvenile logically has
the same right as the county attorney to request such an order.
Accordingly, the Rules provide that the child may initiate the
request for reference.30
Although in most cases the juvenile would probably choose
to be adjudicated by the juvenile court rather than by the criminal court, there appear to be exceptions. One such situation
might be where the offense alleged is a minor traffic violation or
a relatively insignificant misdemeanor. The juvenile may feel
that the light criminal sanction would be less severe than the
juvenile court disposition.31 A second case might arise where a
serious offense is alleged, but the juvenile denies guilt. He may
have a defense-impossibility or mistake, for example-which he
thinks would be more effective in the criminal court or he may
want the benefit of certain procedural safeguards of the criminal court unavailable in the juvenile court, such as the right
to a jury. In these circumstances, the juvenile may receive
more favorable treatment in the criminal court than in the juvenile court.
It might be argued that the juvenile should be allowed to
benefit from any advantages of the criminal proceeding if he
so desires, on the rationale that he should not receive a more
severe disposition in the juvenile court than he would receive if
an adult.3 2 Whether or not this rationale is sound, the juvenile
will face a substantial problem arguing that he should be referred under the Minnesota statute. Due to the two bases of
reference specified in the statute, ihe juvenile would be placed
in the untenable position of arguing that he is either unsuitable
for the court's beneficient treatment, or that he is sufficiently
dangerous that the public safety could not otherwise be served.
In the first case posited above-the minor traffic offense or
misdemeanor-the court might grant the juvenile's motion to
refer under the finding of unsuitability. This might be a sound
29. AiT=. STAT. § 260.125 (1) (1967).
30. MJCR 8-1(1).
31. See generally Note, supra note 19, at 318-19; Comment, Representing the Juvenile, supra note 7. Reference would, of course, be unavailable in this instance in those jurisdictions which require an act
which would be a felony if committed by an adult as a condition of
reference.
32. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the law which
Gault allegedly violated provided a penalty, if the offender were an
adult, of a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two
months. 387 U.S. at 8-9. Gault, then age 15, was committed by the
juvenile court to the state industrial school until age 21. 387 U.S. at 7.
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conclusion if the juvenile's record indicated a series of unsuccessful efforts by the juvenile court to treat the child. In such a
case, he may not in fact be suitable to the juvenile court's treatment options and the court may conclude that a mild criminal
penalty is a preferable disposition.33 However, it is difficult to
see how a request for referral in the second case-an alleged
serious offense where guilt is denied-could be granted under a
valid finding of either unsuitability or danger to the public. It appears erroneous to argue that the juvenile should be
referred solely because the alleged offense is serious,34 and, if the
juvenile is not guilty, as the juvenile court is as able to correctly
determine that issue as the criminal court. Further, there is no
reason why a juvenile who may have a defense thought more
effective in a criminal court should be referred for that reason.
The basis for reference is a finding of either unsuitability
or danger to the public, not the juvenile's assertion of a
particular defense. 35 Therefore, while it appears appropriate to
allow the juvenile the right to request reference for prosecution,
the statutory bases of reference will likely preclude reference
except in cases of minor offenses.
B.

CONTWT OF NoricE

If the juvenile judge believes that retention of jurisdiction
would be contrary to the best interests of the child or the public
safety, he enters a reference order which fixes the time for a
hearing, states that reference will be considered and sets forth
the reasons for consideration of reference. 36 Notice of the
hearing, including the reasons for consideration of reference,
must be given to the parties.37 The child and his counsel are
33. This disposition would seem particularly appropriate in traffic offender cases, since the juvenile court cannot impose a fine and
may feel that its other alternatives, such as recommending suspension
of the juvenile's license, are unnecessarily severe.
34. See text accompanying notes 69 &70 infra.
35. The statutory provisions of CoLo. REV. STAT. Anw. § 37-8-7
(1963) and ILL. STAT. ANN., ch. 37, § 702-7(5) (1966) provide that a
juvenile has a right to a criminal trial if he so demands. These provisions have been criticized on the ground that the proper basis of
reference is that the juvenile will not benefit from the rehabilitative
efforts of the juvenile court, not that he disdains them. See Note,
supra note 19, at 319-20.
36. MJCR 8-1(3).
37. The Rules provide that if summons and notice in connection
with the adjudicatory hearing have not yet been issued and served, notice of the reference hearing shall be given in such summons and notice.
MJCR 8-2 (1), 4-2 (c). If summons and notice of the adjudicatory hear-
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thus provided with the opportunity for some preparation to meet
the issues which are likely to be raised at the reference hearing.
However, the Rules do not require that the notice contain a
statement of the alleged facts supporting the reasons for the
consideration of reference. 88 Because of the severe sanctions that
may follow reference for prosecution, 9 the notice afforded the
child should be as complete as possible. At the adjudicatory
hearing, the need for notice of specifically alleged facts is obviously critical because the result of that hearing depends upon
the existence of these facts. While at the reference hearing the
court need only conclude that one of the statutory grounds is
met, such a conclusion also must rest upon particular facts. Since
the child should have the fullest opportunity to refute the
the adjudicatory hearing,
allegations of fact, just as he may do 4at
0
notice of such facts appears desirable.
Further, reference is an exceptional procedure in that the
juvenile court terminates its responsibility for dealing with the
relatively few juveniles who are hcapable of benefiting from
juvenile facilities. 41 Since only particular facts make consideration of reference appropriate, notice of these facts should be
given to assure that the parties have the opportunity to present
all relevant information.
C. APPonwrmNT OF CouNsEL
Under the Minnesota statute, the juvenile has a right to
counsel, and if necessary, counsel will be appointed by the
ing have been issued and served, a copy of the reference order is to be
served on the parties. MJCR 8-2 (2).
38. The notice could contain as lit;tle as a statement that reference will be considered either on the ground that the child is unsuitable for treatment under juvenile facilities or that the public safety requires reference.
39. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
40. The Rules appear to be incomistent in requiring the county

attorney to allege facts supporting reasons in the petition for reference,
MJCR 8-1(2), yet deleting the requirement of notice of such facts from
Rules 4-2(c) and 8-1 (3), which require the court to notify the parties
only of the reasons for consideration of reference, not the alleged facts
underlying such reasons. Since the petition, like all documents in the
court file, is available for inspection by the parties, MNN. STAT. § 260.161
(1) (1967), the attorney for the child could ascertain such facts by exarnining the county attorney's petition. The Rule provision will therefore preclude the child from obtaining notice of the facts only where his
attorney neglects to examine the filed petition.
41. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
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court.42 The Rules require that the juvenile be informed of this
right in the notice of the reference hearing. 43 The court also
must ascertain at the beginning of the hearing whether the
juvenile is represented and if not, whether the juvenile under44
stands his right to counsel.
At the reference hearing, it would seem that in most cases
a substantial conflict may exist between the juvenile's interest
in remaining within the juvenile court system and the community's interest in protection. The need for counsel may well be
greater at the reference hearing than at the adjudicatory hearing
45
since the reference hearing contemplates criminal sanctions.
Further, the nature of the allegations might demand the presence of, and active participation by, counsel for the juvenile, for
the child must contest not the existence of an alleged set of facts,
as at the adjudicatory hearing, but rather the assertion of more
or less expert opinions regarding his suitability for treatment
under various dispositional schemes. Kent stressed the importance of counsel at the reference hearing in order to intelligently
weigh such reports and testimony on which the decision to refer
46
may be based.
Although most rights accorded the juvenile by the Rules
are waivable, the right to counsel at the reference hearing is not,
47
if the act alleged would be a felony if committed by an adult.
This provision apparently reflects the view that a juvenile
might waive his right to counsel without full understanding of
the consequences of such waiver. If the presence of counsel at
the reference hearing is generally desirable, it is critical where
the offense would be a felony in criminal court because of the
severe consequences which might follow from a criminal con42. MiNN. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1967). Both the child and his parent are parties, MJCR 1-2(o), to whom the right to counsel is granted
under MJCR 2-1. Each has the right to separate counsel where their
interests conflict.
43. MJCR 4-2 (d).
44. MJCR 8-4, 5-1; see also Note, Basic Rights for Juveniles in
Juvenile Proceedings Under the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules: A
Response to Gault, 54 Mlm. L. REv. 335 (1969).
45. Kent quoted with approval a holding of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia that the need for counsel is greater at
the reference hearing than at the adjudicatory hearing. Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 558 (1966), citing Black v. United States, 355 F.2d
104, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46. 383 U.S. 541, 562-63 (1966). The Court in Gault later referred
to Kent as indicating counsel to be "essential" for the purposes of the
reference hearing. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
47. MJCR 1-5(1).
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viction if the case is referred. 4 8 The Rules provide that the
child may, however, waive his right to counsel if the act alleged
would not be a felony, since the consequences of a criminal conviction in such a case are less severe.
D.

ADmissiBLm

OF EVIDENCE

Although the reference hearing occurs prior to adjudication,
it is essentially a dispositional hearing.49 The juvenile's guilt is
not at issue; rather, the issue is the proper disposition if he is
found to have committed the acts alleged. It is therefore desirable that the court have available to it the maximum reliable
information relevant to the question of whether the juvenile
will respond to juvenile facilities and programs.
The use of social and probation reports is common in the
post-adjudicative stage of adult sentencing determinations.
Such information is necessary in order to individualize
the disposition of the adult offender.50 Thus it appears, for the
same reason, that social reports should be available to the juvenile judge at the reference hearing. Indeed, the nature of the
reference hearing renders the social study, which is an investigation of the personal and family history and the environment
of the juvenile,51 a particularly apt source of information relevant to the decision.
However, the Minnesota statute prohibits undertaking a social study prior to the hearing if the juvenile denies the allegations
of the petition.52 Apparently, no such report could be admitted
into evidence at the reference hearing, and is therefore unavailable for the determination of whether to refer the case for pro48. COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, Rule 11 (1969) also suggests a nonwaivable right to counsel. Cf. MICHIGAN JUVENILE COURT
RULES, Rule 11 (1969) requiring counsel to be appointed unless the
parties request to the contrary. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMiMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORIM JUVENILE COURT ACT, § 26 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT] provides a waivable

right to counsel.
49. For a further discussion of admissibility of evidence, see Note,

Standards of Proof and Admissibility in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 54
MINN. L. REV.362 (1969).
50. E.g., Williams v.New York,337 U.S.241 (1949).
51. See MnN. STAT. § 260.151 (1967); MJCR 10-1.
52. MINN. STAT. § 260.151(2) (1967). This provision is apparently based on a concern for the child's privacy at this stage of the
proceeding, rather than on a concern that hearsay evidence should not
be admissible, since the prohibition is directed at the "conducting" of
such a study.
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secution. The Rules do provide, however, that a reference
study5 3 may be made and admitted into evidence at the refer-

ence hearing. This study consists of the juvenile court record
of the child and the circumstances surrounding any violation of
law which is the basis of the delinquency charge. But due to its
restricted scope, the reference study would appear to be of limited value in aiding the reference decision. It will not contain
any information concerning the child's environment or emotional
attitude, both of which are relevant in determining the child's
suitability to juvenile rehabilitation programs.
While precluding the social study, the statute is silent on the
question of what other evidence is admissible at the reference
hearing. However, the Rules provide a broad standard of admissibility and expressly allow hearsay and opinion evidence. 54
Clearly all evidence relevant to the issue of referral should be
available to the court, and it is particularly desirable to allow
the child to present all evidence which may point to the possible
success of his rehabilitation within the juvenile system.5 5 However, the state will be more likely than the child to take advantage of this blanket allowance of hearsay. While the state
may introduce statements of third parties tending to show unsuitability for treatment or danger to the public, it seems unlikely that the child would present hearsay evidence to the
effect that he is capable of benefiting from the juvenile court's
disposition.56
The combination of the statute and the Rules produces the
questionable result that, in the reference hearing, the somewhat
screened hearsay in the social report is inadmissible, yet other
less controlled hearsay is admissible. While social reports
contain substantial hearsay evidence, the hearsay in such reports has presumably been screened by a trained social worker
or probation officer, thus establishing some limitation of the
amount and kind of hearsay in the report. Since there is no
53. MJCR 10-4.
54. MJCR 8-6.
55. See generally Note, supra note 19, at 335-39; Comment, Separating the CriminalFrom the Delinquent, supra note 7. Stressing the
importance of the reference decision, the UNIFomwE JuVE=mE COURT ACT,
supra note 48, § 34, Comment (1969) favors a "full and unrestricted"
hearing.
56. Evidence of this sort would appear most likely to come from
the child himself. Further, relevant opinion evidence would be admissible without the Rule provision. See generally J. Lrrn oRE, MINNESOTA
EVIDENCE § 55 (1968); C. McCoRmwcK, EVDENCE §§ 11-12 (1954).
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screening of the hearsay that is admissible at the reference hearing, the possibility of use of such information is much
more extensive. The purposes of the reference hearing would
be better served if the statute were amended to allow the use
of a social study. Even though intrusion into the privacy of the
juvenile and his family would result,57 the reference decision
should be made on the basis of the most complete and relevant
information possible.
With such a broad scope of admissibility, the Rules properly
preclude the use of reports and testimony from the reference
hearing in the later juvenile court adjudicatory hearing.
Although the statute bars the use of such evidence in any
non-juvenile court,58 it makes no similar provision for subsequent hearings in the juvenile court. The statutory bar on the
use of evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution is, at least
in part, grounded on the fear that the state may use the hearing as an exploratory discovery proceeding. The Rules clarify
and extend this policy and provide that hearsay and opinion
evidence 9 and the reference study"'° are inadmissible at a subsequent adjudicatory hearing in the Juvenile court.6 '
Where the court has considered and denied reference, the
Rules provide that the child may require a different judge to sit
at the subsequent adjudicatory hearing.62 The judge at the
reference hearing must necessarily receive information adverse
to the child which would not be admissible at the adjudicatory
hearing. Therefore, a new judge may be necessary to provide an
impartial determination of the factual allegations of the petition.
E.

CRITERIA FOR RFEREcE FOR PROSECUTION

While the Minnesota statute requires that, prior to reference,
the court find that one of the two bases for reference exists, it
does not indicate what criteria are relevant to this determina57. See note 52 supra.
58. MN. STAT. § 260.211(1) (1967).
59. MJCR 5-3.
60. MJCR 10-4(3).
61. Compare UNIFORM JuvENi COURT AcT, supra note 48, § 34(d)
(1969) which provides not only that testimony given by the juvenile at
the reference hearing is inadmissible in the later criminal proceeding,
but also that any statements made by the juvenile after being taken into
custody and prior to notice of the reference hearing are not admissible
over objection in the criminal proceeding.
62. MJCR 8-8. The UNIFORM JUVNILE COURT AcT, supra note 48,
§ 34(e) (1969) has a similar provision.
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tion.63 Similarly, courts seldom articulate the criteria upon
which their decision was based.6 4 The few available studies of
reference for prosecution indicate that a wide variety of criteria
are used, and that many of these are of questionable relevance.6 5
The Rules deem four criteria relevant to the statutory conclusions: (1) the type of offense; (2) whether the offense is
part of a repetitive pattern; (3) the record of the child; and
(4) the relative suitability of programs and facilities available
to the juvenile and criminal courts.66
With respect to these criteria, an initial ambiguity arises
since four criteria are listed as relevant to two conclusions, either
of which will support reference for prosecution. There is no
indication in the Rules whether all are intended to be equally
relevant to each of the statutory conclusions. For example, the
67
criterion of the "type of offense"1
may be relevant to a conclusion that the public safety requires reference but seems to
63. One court has stated with regard to the absence of such

standards:

It is disquieting to me to learn that judicial action is taken
without governing standards available to the public. To me
this absence permits judicial decision by whim or caprice, and
leads to unequal treatment under the law to the parties before
the court.
United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545 (D.D.C. 1965). Cf. the re-

cently revised Texas reference statute, Tsx. Crv. STAT. art. 2338-1(6)
(h) (Supp. 1968), which lists a number of factors deemed relevant.
64. One of the few cases which gives any indication of the factors
a district court looked to in ruling on the analogous motion to convene
itself as a juvenile court is United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545
(D.D.C. 1965).
65. Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts,
8 CRIME & DELiNQ. 3 (1962); TASK FORCE, supra note 5, 78, app. B,
table 5 (1967); Comment, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Wisconsin Juvenile
Courts, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 551.
66. MJCR 8-7(2) (a)-(d). Criteria (a),(c) and (d) are the same
as those recommended by the Advisory Council of Judges, National
Council on Crime and Delinquency in Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 8 CRME & DEmIIQ. 3 (1962). It is relevant to
note again the limited nature of the information available to the court
at this stage of the proceeding. Because of the statutory prohibition on
conducting a social study prior to the hearing if the child denies the
allegations of the petition, only the limited reference study may be
made. A social study is, however, admissible in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., N.J. Juv. CT. Ruin 6:3-9, which allows a social investigation to
be made at any time. See also TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(6) (d) (Supp.
1968). TuE UNIFom JUVENME COuRT ACT § 28(a) (1969) permits a social investigation to be made after notice of the hearing is given. See
text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
67. MJCR 8-7 (2) (a).
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have little relevance to the juvenile's suitability for treatment. 8
On the other hand, the "type of offense" criterion appears
to be easily translatable into the criterion of the "seriousness of
the offense." This criterion should not be relevant to the issue
of the juvenile's suitability to juvenile court treatment since a
young murderer may be no less capable of rehabilitation than a
young shoplifter. Most authorities agree that the commission
of a particularly serious crime does not necessarily preclude
juvenile rehabilitation and treatment. 9
Nor does the seriousness of the offense appear to be directly
relevant to the issue of the protection of the public safety. One
severe offense would not automatically indicate the likelihood
of repetition. Rather, additional factors such as the circumstances surrounding the crime, whether it involved force or violence,
the mental state of the juvenile at the time the offense was
committed and the nature of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act are more directly relevant to the issue of the
public safety.70 From these and similar factors, a rational
judgment might be drawn concerning the juvenile's danger to
the public.
The second and third criteria are relevant both to the issue of
suitability for treatment and to the issue of public safety. Both
7 2
a repetitive pattern of conduct 7 ' and a previous juvenile record
indicate either that the child is dangerous to the public, if the acts
are serious, or that prior juvenile treatment programs have been
unsuccessful. Both criteria point to past conduct of the juvenile,
providing perhaps the best available basis for drawing inferences about his possible future conduct.
The final criterion, the relative suitability of programs and
68. The type of offense may be relevant in those few cases where
the nature of the offense itself, for example, a compulsive act, indicates a
continuing likelihood of future harm.
69. See Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 65, at 6; Comment,
Representing the Juvenile in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 424
(1968). But see Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 605 (1968).
A number of statutes deem seriousness a factor, e.g., TEx. CIv. SrAT.
art. 2338-1(6) (g) (Supp. 1968). Cf. CAL. WELF. & INsTN's CODE § 707
(Supp. 1968), which under a test of "not a fit and proper subject" to be
dealt with under juvenile procedures, states that in so determining, "the
offense, in itself, shall not be sufficienl:" to support a finding that the
minor is not a fit and proper subject.
70. See, e.g., Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, UNIFoR
POLICY POSIToN OF THE JUDGES (May 18, 1966).
71. MJCR 8-7(2) (b).
72. MJCR 8-7(2) (c).
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facilities available to either set of courts,73 is clearly an important
consideration since the reference decision is essentially dispositional. An analysis of the suitability of such programs and
facilities available to each court, including such factors as personnel available, type of population in a particular institution
and the type of security necessary, seems necessary if the de74
cision is to be rationally made.
One difficulty presented by the form of the statute is that
at least one of the conclusions required is neither clearly nor
readily ascertainable. The statutorily required conclusion of
unsuitability to treatment is at best a nebulous concept. Indeed, several commentators have doubted whether such conclusions can be meaningfully drawn given the present stage of
psychiatry and social work.7 5 The conclusion of unsuitability,
because of its vagueness, is open to abuse as a convenient rationalization which may allow a court to refer when it desires to do so
for a variety of irrelevant or unarticulated reasons.
Public pressure may be such an unarticulated but powerful
factor. Both the prosecutor and the judge may be under pressure
to refer the case of a juvenile who has allegedly committed a
serious offense. Although the independent judiciary is supposed
to exercise its responsibilities free from the pressures of the
political arena, the Rules may not sufficiently exclude this factor
from consideration. The "type of offense" criterion, allowing
consideration of the seriousness of the offense, could be the
means by which public pressure forces a decision to refer.
If the juvenile has committed a serious offense and is in
fact extremely dangerous, or if the failure of prior treatment
attempts indicates the likelihood of additional failures in the
future, reference should, of course, be considered. For example,
in the case of a juvenile who has allegedly committed a series
of armed grocery store holdups in which persons were injured,
and whose mental condition indicates that he may rob again,
there is evidence of his dangerousness and perhaps his unsuitability to treatment under juvenile court facilities. On the
other hand, if he has committed a serious offense but is not
extremely dangerous or there is no substantial evidence indi73. MJCR 8-7(2) (d).

74. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(6) (h) (6)
11.1(B) (4) (1969).

(1968); MIcE.

JUv. CT. RULE

75. See Croxton, The Kent Case and Its Consequences, 7 J. FAM.
L. 1 (1967); Schultz, The Adversary Process, the Juvenile Court and the
Social Worker, 36 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 288 (1968).
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cating that he is likely to be unresponsive to juvenile court
disposition, then reference should not be considered. For example, in the case of a juvenile with no prior record who has
allegedly committed a highly situational crime, such as an assault
upon a girlfriend's just-discovered lover, there may be no more
reason to conclude that he is either more dangerous or incapable
of rehabilitation than other juveniles. If he is unlikely to repeat the act and appears likely to benefit from the juvenile
court's treatment programs, the fact that he has committed a
serious offense should be irrelevant to the issue of reference.
The criterion of the "type of offense" may, however, allow public pressure to force reference in a case where the child is neither
unsuitable to juvenile court disposition nor sufficiently dangerous so that the public safety cannot otherwise be protected.
The four criteria provided in the Rules are not exhaustive.
Additional relevant criteria have been employed in other jurisdictions. The policy memorandum of the Juvenile Court of the
District of Columbia7 6 provides the same two basic standards as
the Minnesota statute, either of which is sufficient to support a
decision to refer for prosecution. The memorandum recommends, as relevant to the basic standards, a consideration of the
age of the juvenile to the extent that a length of time beyond the
limits of juvenile court jurisdiction is required for reasonable
prospects of rehabilitation. 77 This factor is relevant to the
suitability issue in that a juvenile may not be suitable to juvenile court disposition should any treatment program need to
continue beyond age 21. It is relevant to the public safety issue
in that the juvenile must be released from the juvenile facility
at age 21, and if unaffected by its rehabilitative efforts, may
commit another offense. This factor may be subsumed in the
Rules under the criterion of "relative suitability of programs" in
either court. To the extent that it may not be, however, it
would be desirable to list it as an additional factor.
Further, the criterion of the protection offered to juveniles
within juvenile institutions 78 is not mentioned in the Rules although it may also be considered under the criterion of "relative
suitability of programs and facilities." Since it is relevant both
to the dangerous juvenile's suitability to treatment and to the
76. Uxoimu Por~cy PosITioN oF = JuDGES, supra note

70.

77. See also Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Courts:
More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (1966).
78. See generally id.
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safety of other juveniles within the system, it would be desirable
to indicate it as an additional criterion.
A final factor considered in other jurisdictions is the presence of co-offenders over the juvenile age limit, especially where
the adult offenders are just over the juvenile age.79 This criterion tends to promote equality of treatment and to eliminate
disparity in sentencing. It is, of course, subject to the criticism
that it arbitrarily deprives the juvenile of the benefits of the
juvenile court act because of the age of his co-offenders. 80 This
objection would be especially acute where the crime alleged
was serious. Nonetheless, it would appear to be relevant if
the juvenile's involvement in the alleged crime approximated
that of the other participants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota reference for prosecution statute, by prescribing minimal procedural requirements and providing that the
court find either unsuitability for treatment or that the public
safety requires reference, provides a suitable basis upon which
a rational policy of reference for prosecution can be developed.
Article 8 of the Rules is a major improvement clarifying and
amplifying the statute. It complies with, and, in some instances,
extends current Supreme Court requirements. Perhaps the major contribution of the Article is to illuminate a process which
has traditionally been obscure, and to prescribe basic procedural
and substantive standards for the guidance of juvenile courts
and attorneys with a view to the ultimate goal of fairness to the
juvenile.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, several modifications
may be suggested. First, the notice provision should be revised
to require the court to give notice of the alleged facts supporting
the reasons for consideration of reference for prosecution. This
modification would provide counsel a more adequate opportunity
to intelligently prepare the child's case. The seriousness of the
decision requires the most complete preparation, and therefore
the most complete notice.
Second, the statute should be amended to allow the use of a
79. This factor is mentioned in the prior standards of the District
of Columbia, Memorandum No. 7, Nov. 30, 1959, now rescinded. These
standards appear as an appendix to the opinion of the Court in Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565 (1966).
80. This factor is criticized as irrelevant in Comment, supra note
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social study at the reference hearing. The social report appears
likely to be the most relevant source of information bearing on
a sound decision on whether to refer. Additionally, the broad
admissibility of hearsay evidence provided by the Rules should
be examined in light of its effect upon the nature of the evidence
actually admitted at the reference hearing. If it appears that
the present provision does not benefit the juvenile in presenting his case to the court, or that the state is using the provision
to introduce unreliable hearsay, a limitation of the hearsay allowance should be considered.
Third, the "type of offense" criterion should be reconsidered
to ascertain whether its basis is actually the danger of
the juvenile, or merely the seriousness of the offense. If it is
construed as danger, a revision should so indicate.
If
seriousness of the offense is meant, this criterion focuses on a
factor which does not go directly to the question of either unsuitability or public safety, and should be deleted as an essentially irrelevant consideration.
Finally, other factors should be considered as relevant to
the Minnesota statutory requirements, such as the juvenile's
age in relation to the time likely to be necessary for rehabilitation, and the amount of protection afforded to juveniles within
juvenile institutions from a particularly dangerous juvenile.
Regardless of the acceptability of any of these possible modifications, the important factor is, of course, that the Article
actually promote the just determination of the issues in the reference hearing. The Article as presently drafted is a sound step
toward the achievement of that goal.

